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A DYNAMIC DEFINITION OF AND PROHIBITION
AGAINST INSIDER TRADING
Oliver Perry Colvin*
Insider trading-the unfair use of material, nonpublic in-
formation concerning an issue of securities-threatens to un-
dermine the integrity of the national securities markets. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the guardian of
America's securities markets, "has repeatedly declared that the
eradication of trading on inside information is one of its top
priority enforcement targets."' Beyond doubt, the SEC's vigor-
ous prosecution of insider trading cases will continue
throughout the 1990s.' Unfortunately, the law governing insid-
er trading presently consists of an incoherent maze of discor-
dant administrative and judicial opinions built upon inappro-
priate fraud-based concepts. Lacking clearly articulated and
consistently applied principles, the piecemeal development of
the law of insider trading has driven the individual investor
from the market and, at the same time, paralyzed securities
professionals.'
Nevertheless, with the despised inside trader4 targeted as
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1. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 13.9 at 137 (2d ed.
practitioner's edition 1990); see also Insider Trading Act of 1987, Aug. 7, 1987,
repinted in 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1284-86 (Aug. 14, 1987).
2. See Mathews, Levine, Citera & Bracher, The SEC's 1988-89 Enfoirement
Program: Pail 1H, 4 Insights 10, 11 (Feb. 1990).
3. See Day, Small Investors Fold Their Hands, Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1990, § H,
at 1 (reporting that in 1965, individuals owned 84% of publicly traded equities. In
1989, individual ownership of publicly traded .equities dropped to just 56%).
4. Indeed, the terms "inside trader" and "insider trading" are misnomers.
Under current administrative and judicial interpretations, liability for insider
trading extends far beyond the classic, high-placed corporate officer and encom-
passes lawyers, doctors and housewives. See, e.g., SEC v. Grossman, No. 1287 Civ.
1031 (SWK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1987) Lit. Rel. No. 11359 (LEXIS, Bankers Library,
Security Regulation) (alleged insider trading by lawyer); United States v. Willis, 737
603
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the principal threat to the nation's capital markets, Congress
has acted in recent years to increase the civil and criminal
penalties for illegal insider trading.' For example, in 1984
Congress amended section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19346 to provide the SEC with authority to seek a civil
money penalty of up to three times the profit gained or the
loss avoided by an inside trader.' In addition, the 1984 Act in-
creased the criminal fines for insider trading from $10,000 to
$100,000.' In 1988, Congress again moved to beef up the pen-
alties for insider trading violations.9 The 1988 Act even autho-
rized the SEC to award bounties to individuals who assisted in
the. apprehension and prosecution of inside traders.'
Paradoxically, the federal securities laws neither define,
nor expressly prohibit, insider trading. Instead, liability for
insider trading has grown out of a curious and inconsistent
"hodgepodge" of administrative" and judicial interpreta-
tions of section 10(b),'3 the general antifraud provision of the
F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (psychotherapist convicted of insider trading); SEC v.
Raab, No. 90-3291 (DLJ) (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1990) (alleged insider trading by
housewife).
5. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat.
1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u and 78ff (1988)); and The
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988) (hereinafter the Exchange Act].
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (1988).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988).
9. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1988)).
In particular, the 1988 Act imposed harsh civil penalties on "controlling persons"
of convicted inside traders. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(3) (1988).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (1988).
11. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
12. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980);
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). This section provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
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Exchange Act, and rule 10b-514 promulgated thereunder,
among other provisions. Not surprisingly, the judicially crafted
parameters have resulted in an "intolerable degree of uncer-
tainty."15 Although the results reached in the administrative
and judicial proceedings are, for the most part, correct, the
analysis and reasoning are flawed. Because of the vague and
shifting standards concerning illegal insider trading, and be-
cause of the increasingly harsh civil and criminal penalties
imposed for violating this undefined crime, calls for a defini-
tion of insider trading have recently reached a fevered
pitch. 6 This article sets forth a new, dynamic definition of
the protection of investors.
Id.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). Rule 10b-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
15. Pitt & Shapiro, The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: A Legislative
Initiative for a Sorely Needed Clarification of the Law Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA.
L. REV. 415, 416 (1988); see also Langevoort, Setting the Agenda for Legislative
Reform: Some Fallacies, Anomalies, and Other Curiosities in the Prevailing Law of Insider
Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 399, 401 (arguing that chaos currently engulfing law of
insider trading due to different judges bringing "different perspectives" to each
particular case). But see Macey, From Judicial Solutions to Political Solutions: The New,
New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 355, 357 (assert-
ing that "the federal judiciary ... has promulgated the most sensible rules on
insider trading.").
16. See Crovitz, The SEC Overstepped When It Made Insider Trading a Crime,
Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1990, at A-17; Block & Hoff, Renewed Interest in Defining
Insider Trading, N.Y.L.J. June 14, 1990, at 5, col. 1; Crovitz, With "Insider Trading"
It's Conviction Fitst-Definition Later, Wall St., May 9, 1990, at A1S, col. 3; Norris,
A Big Loophole in Insider Cases, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1990, at D8, col. 3.; Pitt &
Groskaufmanis, Family Ties, Tippees and the Chestman Decision: Time for a Principled
Definition of Insider Trading, 4 Insights 7 (July 1990); Roundup: Regulation, Wash.
Post, May 11, 1990, at F-2 (reporting that Representatives John Dingell and Ed-
ward Markey requested assistance from the SEC in drafting a legislative definition
of insider trading); Congress May Consider Definition of Insider Trading, Auditor
Whistleblowing, Fair Trade Issues During 1991, 6 Corp. Council Weekly 5, 8 (BNA)
Uan. 30, 1991) (explaining that "[t]he idea of legislatively defining insider insider
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insider trading, one that seeks to protect the integrity of the
securities markets while encouraging the free flow of legitimate
information to the market.
Part I of this article briefly examines the chaotic law gov-
erning insider trading. Part II describes the economic and
policy considerations that support the enactment of a clear
and concise definition of insider trading. Part III examines the
most recently proposed definition of insider trading, The In-
sider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987.17 Finally, Part IV in-
troduces a new, dynamic definition of insider trading (the
"Act") and tests the Act against a series of hypothetical situ-
ations.
I. THE LAW GOVERNING INSIDER TRADING
The law governing insider trading is grounded on three
distinct statutory provisions. Section 16 of the Exchange Act'"
imposes trading restrictions on statutorily defined insid-
ers-directors, officers and large shareholders.'9 More specifi-
cally, section 16 requires the designated insiders to return
short-swing trading profits to the corporation." Significantly,
liability under section 16 is strict; it does not turn on the
insider's knowledge and intent.2
The second source regulating insider trading is rule
14e-3. 2 Promulgated by the SEC in 1980, rule 14e-3 was spe-
cifically designed to deter insider trading in connection with
tender offers. 3 In brief, rule 14e-3 prohibits any person other
than a bidder or prospective bidder from trading a security
subject to an actual or potential tender offer if such person
possesses material, nonpublic information concerning the ten-
trading could resurface in 1991"). But see Sturc, Where Insiders Trade, Law Reads
Unceilainty, Legal Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at 33, col. 1 (questioning whether legisla-
tive definition of insider trading is necessary).
17. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.,
133 CONG. REC. § 8247 (daily ed. June 17, 1987).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988). An exhaustive analysis of section 16 is set forth in
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Repo,1 of the Task Foite on Reg-
ulation of hsider Trading Part lI: Reforn of Section 16, 42 BUS. LAW. 1087 (1987).
19. Id.
20. id.
21. Id.
22. 17"C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990).
23. Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17120, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,
410-13 (Sept. 12, 1980).
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der offer and such person knows or has reason to know that
the information is both nonpublic and originated from a per-
son acting on behalf of the bidder or target.24 Because of its
broad "while in possession of" language and quasi-negligence
standard, rule 14e-3 has significantly extended the reach of the
prohibition against insider trading and, correspondingly, the
influence and power of the SEC. In fact, the SEC has been
accused of exceeding its authority in promulgating rule
14e-3.' 5 Thus far, however, rule 14e-3 has survived the recent
assaults and remains a viable enforcement tool for the SEC.26
The final, and by far the most important,27 source of regu-
lation of insider trading is rule 10b-5,28 promulgated by the
SEC under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.29 Rule 10b-5
does not specifically prohibit, much less mention, insider trad-
ing. Rather, the prohibition against insider trading under rule
10b-5 is strictly the result of nearly thirty years30  of
ever-evolving administrative and judicial decisions.
Rule 10b-5 has been interpreted as imposing an alternative
duty on "insiders" to either disclose the material, nonpublic
information prior to trading or to abstain from trading on the
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1989).
25. See United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d I Cir. 1990), rehg en
bane granted, 1990 Transfer Binder, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,439, at 97,238
(Aug. 24, 1990); United States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 710 F. Supp. 944
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also, Raymond, Validity Challenges to SEC Rule 14e-3, 23 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 305 (1990).
26. O'Connor & Assocs., 529 F. Supp. 1179 at 1191 ("The broad grant of
authority to the SEC to define the particular practices banned by [section 14(e)]
supports the proposition that the statute was not intended to be limited as defen-
dants assert."). But see Chestman, 903 F.2d at 84 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (concluding that the SEC "exceeded its statutorily granted
authority by promulgating rule 14e-3 without including any requirement of a
breach of fiduciary duty").
27. Shapiro, Recent Developments Securities: Rule lOb-5 and Insider Trading, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 265, 267 (1987) (observing that rule 1Ob-5 is the work-
horse provision employed by the SEC in prosecuting insider trading cases).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989). For complete text of rule 10b-5, see supia
note 14.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1989). For complete text of section 10(b), see supra
note 13.
30. Although rule 10b-5 and insider trading cases may trace their beginnings
to as early as 1943 (see In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943)),
Rule 10b-5's prohibition against insider trading gained prominence in 1961 (see In
re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
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basis of such information."s The duty to disclose or abstain
from trading has its genesis in the seminal SEC decision In re
Cady, Roberts & Co. 2 In that case, the Commission imposed
the disclose or abstain obligation on a corporate director be-
cause of:
[T]he existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for
a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone, and [because of] the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information know-
ing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
33
The duty to disclose or to abstain from trading was given judi-
cial life by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. 4 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the court reasoned that fairness
and, more specifically, the 'justifiable expectation of the securi-
ties marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal ex-
changes have relatively equal access to material informa-
tion"" supported the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule.
In 1980, in Chiarella v. United States,36 the Supreme Court
radically changed the law of insider trading. The Court specifi-
cally rejected the "parity of information" doctrine and held
that mere possession of material, nonpublic information does
not, by itself, trigger the disclose or abstain rule." Rather, lia-
bility under Rule lOb-5 "is premised upon a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
the parties to a transaction." 8 Absent some fiduciary duty to
disclose, the Court reasoned, no fraud had occurred. 9 The
31. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), ceit. denied, Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
32. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
33. Id. at 912.
34. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cen. denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
35. Id. at 848.
36. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
37. Id. at 235.
38. Id. at 230. Indeed, the introduction of the fraud-based duty concept has
raised significant problems in the area of the insider trading of junk bonds where
the insiders do not traditionally owe duties to debt holders. See 23 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 525 (Apr. 12, 1991).
39. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-30 (the Court premised its holding on RESTATE.-
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Court's sudden introduction of the fraud concept of fiduciary
duty sent the SEC reeling and, in turn, desperately searching
for a theory to reach beyond the traditional fiduciary, the cor-
porate insider.
Faced with the confusing and potentially limiting concept
of a fiduciary duty standard, the SEC advanced the even more
ambiguous misappropriation theory. Under that theory, any
person who misappropriates-or, to put it more bluntly,
steals40-material, nonpublic information in breach of a fidu-
ciary duty and later trades on the basis of such purloined in-
formation is liable under rule 10b-5. 41 The Second Circuit has
readily embraced and utilized the misappropriation theory on
several occasions to find an investment banker 4' and a finan-
cial printer 41 liable for insider trading. In both instances, the
court stretched the common law definition of a fiduciary to
find that the employees had violated their so-called fiduciary
duties owed to their employers and their employers' clients."
In the first of two significant anomalies, however, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.4' held that, in the
absence of some fiduciary duty owed to the particular private
plaintiff by the alleged misappropriator, the misappropriation
theory does not apply. On the other hand, when the plaintiff is
the government, liability for insider trading under the misap-
propriation theory merely requires a showing that the misap-
propriator violated some fiduciary duty by disclosing or trad-
ing.46 In SEC v. Materia, the court stated that the fiduciary
duty "analysis bears only on the type of question raised in a
private suit for damages; it is not relevant to an inquiry into
whether [rule 10b-5] was or was not contravened. 4' Accord-
MENT (SECOND) TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976) regarding the common law fraud of mis-
representation and omision).
40. Id. at 245 (Burger, C.j., dissenting).
41. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affid, 484
U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), ceil. denied, 471 U.S.
1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cell. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
42. Newman, 664 F.2d 12.
43. Materia, 745 F.2d 197. The Ninth Circuit recently adopted the misappro-
priation theory in SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
44. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17; Matetia, 745 F.2d at 202-03.
45. 719 F.2d 5, 11-16 (2d Cir. 1983).
46. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17; Materia, 745 F.2d at 202-03.
47. Materia, 745 F.2d at 203.
1991] 609
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ingly, the reach of the misappropriation theory turns, in part,
on the identity of the plaintiff.
The second anomaly under the misappropriation theory
surfaced in Carpenter v. United States.4 In Carpenter, Winnans,
a reporter for The Wall Street Journal, secretly and selectively
disclosed information concerning upcoming corporate profiles
in his "Heard on the Street" columns.49 The tenor and con-
tent of the column routinely and significantly affected the
price of the subject corporation's securities. Employing the
misappropriation theory, the court held that Winnans had
breached his duty of confidentiality to his employer, The Wall
Street Journal, by divulging proprietary and confidential infor-
mation belonging to his employer." Ironically, because The
Wall Street Journal did not owe anyone any fiduciary-type duty,
the newspaper could have traded on the basis of the confiden-
tial information without incurring Rule 10b-5 liability."
In Dirks v. SEC,52 the Supreme Court addressed the du-
ties and the liabilities of tippees, the recipients of inside in-
formation. The Court, clinging to the fiduciary duty concept
articulated in Chiarella,51 stated that, "[i]n determining wheth-
er a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it thus
is necessary to determine whether the insider's 'tip' constituted
a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty."54 An insider breach-
es his or her fiduciary duty if, according to the Court, the tip
was made for an improper purpose.5 An improper purpose
is found where "the insider personally will benefit, either di-
rectly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal
gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And
absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach"
by the tippee.5 ' Accordingly, a tippee is apparently liable un-
der Rule 10b-5 only when the tippee trades on the basis of
material, nonpublic information that was revealed by a person
in breach of a fiduciary duty, when such revelation was for an
48. 484 U.S. 19 (1987), affg securities issues, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
49. Id. at 1026.
50. Id. at 1034.
51. Id. at 1033-34.
52. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
53. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
54. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661.
55. Id. at 660.
56. Id. at 662.
610 [Vol. 31
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improper purpose and when the tippee knows or has reason to
know that the tipper has breached a duty of confidentiality by
disclosing such information. 7 Just what exactly satisfies the
"personal benefits" test is extremely uncertain. Moreover, it
is unsettled just how much a tippee must know about the
tipper's breach before Rule 1Ob-5 liability arises. This last ambi-
guity was recently addressed by the Second Circuit.
In United States v. Chestman,59 a fractured panel of the
Second Circuit confronted the issue of when a remote tippee
(Chestman) is liable under Rule 10b-5 for insider trading.
Chestman argued that his trades in Waldbaum securities were
based on preexisting research and were not based on confiden-
tial takeover information purportedly revealed by a Waldbaum
family member, Keith Loeb.6" Sidestepping Chestman's con-
tention, the court held that, although Chestman knew that
Loeb was a member of the Waldbaum family and that the
takeover information was not "generally available," the prose-
cutor failed to produce evidence that Chestman knew that
Loeb's disclosure constituted a breach of Loeb's fiduciary du-
ty.6 Specifically, the court stated:
[T]here simply is no evidence that [Chestman] knew that
Loeb was breaching a confidential relationship by impart-
ing the information to him. The government can point to
nothing in the record demonstrating actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of Chestman that Keith Loeb was
pledged to secrecy by [Loeb's wife], who was pledged to
secrecy by [Loeb's mother-in-law], who was pledged to
secrecy by Ira Waldbaum.6 2
According to the court, the links of secrecy were too attenuat-
ed to impute Chestman with any constructive knowledge that
the information was confidential and that Loeb's disclosure of
57. Id. at 659-63.
58. In Dirks, the Court commented that the personal benefits analysis should
"focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect
personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational
benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id. at 663.
59. United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), reh'g en banc
granted, 1990 Transfer Binder, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,439, at 97,238 (2d
Cir. Aug. 24, 1990).
60. Id. at 77-78.
61. Id. at 79.
62. Id.
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the information constituted a breach of a fiduciary duty.63
Finally, the court quickly rejected the prosecutor's attempt to
hang Chestman with rule 10b-5 liability under the misappropri-
ation theory by stating that "[t]here can be no misappropria-
tion of information by one who is unaware of the confidentiali-
ty of that information."64 On August 24, 1990, the Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed to rehear the Chestman case.65
This second guessing has fueled the uncertainty surrounding
insider trading and underscores the need for precise legislative
repair.
In sum, insider trading liability, particularly under rule
10b-5, is subject to the shifting analyses of the judiciary. The
resulting court-created parameters of insider trading jurispru-
dence are ambiguous and unsettled. The "intolerable degree of
uncertainty" surrounding insider trading warrants immediate
legislative action.66 However, before detailing and examining
the most recent legislative attempt to define insider trading
and describing and testing the Act, it is necessary to address
the economic and policy considerations underlying insider
trading.
II. THE ECONOMIC AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF INSIDER
TRADING: COMPLICATING THE PUZZLE
A. Economic Considerations
The puzzle of insider trading is complicated by conflicting
and often polar opposite economic considerations. On the one
hand, there is a wealth of literature arguing that insider trad-
ing purportedly promotes economic efficiency and, therefore,
should not be prohibited.67 On the other hand, numerous
commentators assert that, on balance, trading by insiders may
63. Id.
64. Id. at 80.
65. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,439, at 97,238 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 1990). The
Second Circuit has not, as of the date of this article, issued its en banc decision
in Chestman.
66. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 416.
67. The economic efficiency camp gained its recognition, if not its start, with
Dean Manne's seminal work, H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MAR-
KET (1966); see also, Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857 (1983); Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1446 (1986); Carney, Signaling & Causation, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 863
(1987).
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actually result in economic inefficiencies.6 8
Critics of insider trading regulation contend that trading
by the most informed investors will quickly and accurately
move the price of a security to its "true" level.6 9 Those advo-
cates assert that accurate pricing information is essential to the
efficient allocation of capital resources. Accordingly, trading by
insiders with their overwhelming informational advantages will
ultimately result in the efficient allocation of capital because of
the now accurate pricing of the affected securities.
Economic critics of a sweeping insider trading prohibition
also assert that, absent transaction costs, the legislature should
simply define, and courts should simply enforce, inside infor-
mation as a property right and allow insiders and outside in-
vestors to allocate such a right.7" This Coasian 7' approach to
insider trading will supposedly result in the parties allocating
the inside information in such a way as to maximize wealth.
Closely associated with the Coasian argument is the assertion
that the allocation of inside information to insiders is an effi-
cient method of compensating corporate insiders.7 2 Both of
the Coasian-based arguments, as well as the efficient pricing
argument, have been roundly criticized.
Proponents of insider trading regulation vehemently dis-
pute the purported economic efficiency argument advanced by
Manne and others." The proponents attack the assertion that
insider trading will result in the accurate pricing of securities.
68. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967); Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules
on the Internal Efficiency of the Laige Cotporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982);
Goelzer, Insider Trading: Introduction, 13 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1 (1984).
69. H. MANNE, supa note 67, at 99-103. Acceptance of the proposition that a
security has a "true" price necessarily means acceptance of the efficient market
theory. The semi-strong form of the efficient market theory suggests that the price
of a security reflects all publicly available information relating to that security. See
generally Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 55
(1965); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theoy and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 387 (1970). For a critique of the efficient market theory, see Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV."549, 554-65 (1984).
70. Carton & Fischel, supra note 67, at 863.
71. See Coase, The Nature of the Fiirn, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
72. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 67, at 869-71.
73. Schotland, supra note 68, at 1438-39; see also Longstreth, Halting Insider
Trading, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at A27, col. 1 (former SEC Commissioner
ripped the economic efficiency proponents of insider trading and stated that
"[t]he arguments in favor of insider trading are, in short, rubbish").
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First, the proponents point out that insiders will benefit and
profit from either good news or bad news. 4 As such, insiders
faced with this "moral hazard" will be more likely to take ab-
normal risks on behalf of the corporation because the more
significant the result, the larger the resulting price movement
of the security. It simply does not matter whether the corpo-
rate action is successful; the only concern of the insider is the
resulting price movement of the security. Second, the propo-
nents argue that authorizing insider trading will decrease the
efficient pricing mechanism of the market by increasing the
incentive to delay the release of corporate information.75 Spe-
cifically, insider trading will distort the market price for a peri-
od of time when corporate information is withheld so that the
insiders may first make their trading profits.76 Third, the pro-
ponents of a prohibition against insider trading argue that
authorizing insider trading will grossly undermine the internal
efficiency of the corporation.77 Professor Haft has observed
that "permitting insider trading would increase delay and dis-
tortion and thus impair decision-making that depends on time-
ly and accurate information from" within the corporate hierar-
chy." In addition, the proponents argue that the
economic-efficiency critics have ignored the devastating effects
of insider trading on widespread investor participation in the
securities markets." In fact, it is well established that the
presence of insider trading destroys investors' confidence in
the fairness and integrity of the securities markets and, at the
same time, impedes the capital formation function of the secu-
rities markets."0
The proponents of insider trading regulation also contest
74. See Warren, A Forewaid on Insider Trading Regulation, 39 ALA. L. REV.
337, 346 (1988) (Professor Warren refers to this phenomenon as a "moral haz-
ard").
75. Haft, supra note 68, at 1055-71.
76. Haft, supra note 68, at 1055-71.
77. Haft, supra note 68, at 1055-71.
78. Haft, supra note 68, at 1057.
79. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Repoi of the Task Force
on Regulation of Insider Trading, Pat I: Regulation Under the Antiraud Pravisions of
the Secuiities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. Lw. 223, 225 (1985); Goelzer, supra
note 68, at 2-3; see also Day, suna note 3.
80. Coelzer, supra note 68, at 2-3. See also 80 H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1983), epinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2274, 2275,
2294.
614 [Vol. 31
INSIDER TRADING
the critics' Coasian-based arguments.8' The proponents cor-
rectly point out that transaction costs are indeed significant
and that monitoring and enforcing contracts allocating the
right to the insider information are costly. 2 The proponents
emphasize that the separation of ownership from control of a
corporation leaves shareholders without an effective means for
preventing management from misusing its broad discretion
and that private contracts are ineffective tools in constraining
the management abuses of insider trading.
8 3
Although not a strict economic efficiency argument, the
strongest argument in favor of a clearly defined prohibition of
insider trading is fairness. In his classic response to Manne,
Professor Schotland noted that "[e]ven if we found that unfet-
tered insider trading would bring an economic gain, we might
still forego that gain in order to secure a stock market ... that
satisflies] such noneconomic goals as fairness, just rewards and
integrity." 4 Indeed, fairness is the cornerstone of the federal
securities laws.85 Courts have recognized that "[t]he fairness
and integrity of conduct within the securities markets is a con-
cern of utmost significance for the proper functioning of our
securities laws." 86 The former General Counsel of the SEC,
Daniel Goelzer, has emphasized that "[c]apital formation and
our nation's economic growth and stability depend on investor
confidence in the fairness and integrity of our capital markets.
Insider trading threatens these markets by undermining the
public's expectations of honest and fair securities markets
81. See Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REV. 377,
390 (1989). For a discussion of transaction costs in corporate governance and
agency-principal relationships, see Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and
the Rhetotic of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of Coiporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989); A. BERLE & C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1968).
82. Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REV. 377, 390
(1989).
83. Brudney, supra note 81, at 1409-11; Gordon, supra note 81, at 1595; A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 81, at 119-25.
84. Schotland, supin note 68, at 1439.
85. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRAC-
TICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934); SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., Sess. 21 (1934).
86. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1986), afl'd, 484
U.S. 19 (1987).
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where all participants play by the same rules.""7 Fairness, and
the corresponding goals of investor confidence and market
integrity, cannot be divorced from economic analysis. The effi-
cient operation of a liquid and responsive securities market
depends, in part, on widespread investor participation. In the
long run, investors will participate only in fair markets, those
markets that they are confident are not manipulated by insid-
ers. To the extent that considerations of fairness conflict with
pure economic analysis, equity should prevail over disputed
economics.
In addition, it is inherently unfair to increase the civil and
criminal penalties for an undefined and poorly articulated
crime. Participants in the securities markets are entitled to
legislative guidance as to what conduct is prohibited. Contin-
ued reliance on the judiciary to craft a predictable and consis-
tent definition of insider trading will contribute to the growing
uncertainty and malaise surrounding the securities markets.
B. Policy Considerations
A legislative solution to the current uncertainties engulfing
insider trading is further exacerbated by political policy consid-
erations. Despite the widely held belief that the undefined
crime of insider trading "unfairly penalizes persons without
[providing] reasonable guidance as to" what conduct is prohib-
ited,"8 the SEC has long opposed a legislative definition of
insider trading. 9 Indeed, the SEC did not propose its own
definition of insider trading until a legislative definition, draft-
ed by a group of private practitioners, appeared imminent.9
Even then, however, the SEC's proposed definition was so im-
precise that it was immediately attacked, and ultimately with-
drawn."
87. Coelzer, supra note 68, at 2-3.
88. Block & Hoff, supra note 16, at 5, col. 1; see also Crovitz, supra note 16
at A-17; Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 417; Cox, Choices: Paving the Road
Toward a "Definition" of Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 381, 381 (1988) (Pro-
fessor Cox has stated that it is "imperative that Congress define insider trading.").
89. See, e.g., The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Heatings on H.R. 559
Before the Subcomm. on Securties of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Ulban
Affaii3, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-38 (1984) (testimony of SEC Enforcement Director
John Fedders) [hereinafter Hearings].
90. See Warren, supra 74, at 338 (Professor Warren observed in early 1988
that a legislative definition of insider trading "appears on the horizon.").
91. Shortly after its submission, the SEC withdrew its proposed definition of
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The SEC has put forth three general policy arguments in
defense of its position that a legislative definition of insider
trading is unwarranted. First, the SEC has asserted that a legis-
lative definition will purportedly provide the unscrupulous
with a blueprint for fraud.92 The SEC has argued that any leg-
islative definition will necessarily be too narrow and inflexible,
potentially permitting "new types of egregious conduct.""3
Representative John Dingell has reasoned that an inflexible,
static definition of insider trading will allow "fertile legal minds
[to] exploit [potential] loopholes."9 4
The second reason advanced by the SEC in opposition to
a concise legislative definition is purely political. Specifically,
the SEC has asserted that it is politically impossible to gain a
meaningful congressional consensus behind any legislative defi-
nition. 5 Consequently, the SEC did not want to derail legisla-
tion which provided for enhanced civil and criminal penalties,
as well as expanding the influence and power of the
turf-conscious regulator, by pushing for an almost unattainable
legislative definition of insider trading.9 6
Finally, the SEC has asserted, and the House Committee
has blindly agreed, that a legislative definition is unnecessary
because the courts have purportedly developed an adequate
definition of insider trading. 7 As detailed above, however,
the court-created parameters of insider trading are woefully
inadequate and uncertain.9" The enigma surrounding the law
insider trading.
92. Heaings, supra note 89, at 35-38 (testimony of Mr. Fedders).
93. Hearings, supra note 89, at 35-38 (testimony of Mr. Fedders).
94. See Statement of Representative John Dingell to Securities Industry Associ-
ation, quoted in Crovitz, supra note 16, at A-15.
95. Hearings. supra note 89, at 35-38 (statement of Mr. Fedders).
96. Heatings, supra note 89, at 35-38; see also Statement of Senator Alfonse
D'Amato that a legislative definition of insider trading was not included in the
1984 Act because "of the complexity of the undertaking, and the necessity for
prompt action." 130 Cong. Rec. 8913 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of
Senator D'Amato); Report of the Committee of Energy and Commerce, H.R. REP.
910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988) [hereinafter Report] (Committee explained
that 1988 Act's failure to include a legislative definition of insider trading was
due, in part, to the "lack of consensus over the proper delineation of an insider
trading definition" and to the belief that the "enforcement reforms encompassed
within" the 1988 Act warranted immediate implementation).
97. Report, supra note 96, at 11. (Committee believed that "the court-drawn
parameters of insider trading have established clear guidelines").
98. See suprn notes 11-66 and accompanying text.
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of insider trading is exemplified by the report accompanying
the 1988 Act. On the one hand, the House Committee assert-
ed in the report that the 1988 Act effectively overruled Moss v.
Morgan Stanley Inc."9 On the other hand, the House Commit-
tee claimed in the report that "the Committee does not intend
to alter the substantive law with respect to insider trading with
this legislation."'00 Those incongruous statements underscore
the confusion surrounding insider trading and highlight the
necessity of, and urgency for, a legislative definition of insider
trading.
The SEC's reluctance to define insider trading cannot
withstand scrutiny. It is patently unfair and possibly unconstitu-
tional... to impose draconian civil penalties and harsh crimi-
nal sanctions on investors for conduct that has never been
defined. Although a narrow definition of insider trading may
potentially provide the sophisticated criminals with legal loop-
holes, a carefully drafted definition, coupled with vigorous
enforcement, will likely provide an effective and comprehen-
sive prohibition against unfair insider trading. At the same
time, a providently articulated legislative definition may, simul-
taneously, encourage the continued flow of information to the
financial markets. It is also far from certain that a legislative
definition is politically impracticable. In fact, former Commis-
sioner Shad has opined that it would be possible to draft a
politically acceptable definition of insider trading.' Further-
more, avoidance of difficult political issues and reliance on
judicial legislation offends our democratic system of govern-
ment. Justice Powell recognized this evil in a slightly different
context when he stated: "Rather than confronting the hard
political choices involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its
constitutional obligation and leave the issue to the courts to
99. Report, supra note 96, at 38-39; see also supra notes 45-47 and accompany-
ing text, discussing Moss, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
100. Report, supra note 96, at 11.
101. It has been suggested that the current chaotic state of tile law governing
insider trading may violate the ex post facto prohibition [U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9,
cl. 3] and fundamental due process rights of the criminally accused [Id. amend.
V]. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 74, at 338.
102. See Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearing on
H.R. 599 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer PrAtection, and Finance
of the House Comm. on Eneigy and Commerce, 98th Cong. Ist Sess. 51 (statement of
Mr. Shad).
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decide. When this happens, the legislative process with its pub-
lic scrutiny and participation has been bypassed, with attendant
prejudice to everyone concerned."03 In short, because the
law of insider trading has developed in a piecemeal fashion
ignoring significant economic and policy considerations, legis-
lative action is necessary.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: THE INSIDER TRADING
PROSCRIPTIONS ACT OF 1987-MORE OF THE SAME
With the introduction of the Insider Trading Proscriptions
Act of 1987,04 Congress came extremely close to enacting a
definition of insider trading. The Proposal and its definition,
however, did not become law. 0 5 Nevertheless, because the
Proposal represented the combined views of prominent practi-
tioners and the SEC, and because the Proposal contained the
most seriously considered definition of insider trading, the
Proposal merits detailed examination.
Introduced by Senators Donald Riegle and Alfonse
D'Amoto °6 and drafted by an all-star committee of private
securities practitioners, 0 7 the Proposal consisted of several
significant components. The first key component of the Pro-
posal, proposed section 16A(b)(l), was aimed at prohibiting
"wrongful trading" of securities by persons in possession of
103. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dis-
senting) (footnote omitted).
104. The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong., Ist
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 8247 (daily ed. June 17, 1987). Several months after S.
1380 was introduced, the SEC submitted its own proposed definition of insider
trading. See Definition of Insider Trading (Pai1 II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 7-12 (Aug. 7, 1987). A reconciliation proposal of S. 1380 was submitted
on November 19, 1987 [hereinafter Proposal]. See letter from Harvey L. Pitt,
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Legislation Committee, to Senator Donald W. Riegle,
Chairman of the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Comm. 1-2 (Nov. 19, 1987), reprinted in SEC Compromise Proposal of
Insider Trading Legislation: Accompanying Lettei; and Analysis by Ad Hoc Legislation
Committee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 1987).
105. See Report, supra note 96, at 11.
106. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
107. The Ad Hoc Legislation Committee consisted of Harvey Pitt, John Olson
and Theodore Levine. For an exhaustive analysis of the Proposal, see Pitt &
Shapiro, supra note 15; Pitt & Shapiro, The Revised Insider Trading Proscliptions Act
of 1988: A Legislative Remedy for a Problem that Peisists, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 7
(1988).
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material, nonpublic information.08 In brief, proposed sec-
tion 16A(b)(1) prohibited trading while in possession of mate-
rial, nonpublic information.0 . if the person engaged in the
trading knew or recklessly disregarded that the information
was either wrongfully obtained or that consummation of the
trade would have constituted a wrongful use of the informa-
tion."1 The thrust of that prohibition turned on the term
"wrongful." The Proposal specifically defined "wrongful" as oc-
curring:
[O]nly if such information has been obtained by, or its use
would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A) theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, espionage (through electric or other
means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, or any other
breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of any personal or other
relationship of trust or confidence, or breach of any con-
tractual or employment relationship.'
For the most part, proposed section 16A(b)(l) essentially codi-
fied the existing administrative and judicial law governing in-
sider trading.
The second principal component of the Proposal con-
cerned tipper-tippee liability. Proposed section 16A(c) prohibit-
ed, in general, any direct or indirect communication of materi-
al, nonpublic information when the tipper-the communicator
of the information-could not have lawfully consummated the
trade and when the tipper knew or recklessly disregarded that
the "tip"-the communication-would lead to a trade in the
subject securities." 2 Unlike proposed section 16A(b)(l), pro-
posed section 16A(c) significantly alters the current legal land-
scape of tipper-tippee liability. Under proposed section 16A(c),
"it is not necessary to prove a wrongful trade by the tippee or
subtippee to sustain an action based on the wrongful commu-
nication against the original tipper.""' Moreover, proposed
section 16A(c) would have eliminated the vague "personal
benefits" analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court in Dirks v.
108. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(b)(1).
109. The Proposal was not intended to displace the court-created definitions of
material and nonpublic. See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 16-17.
110. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(b)(l).
111. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(b)(1).
112. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(c).
113. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 422 n.23.
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SEC." 4 Tippee liability would have turned on proposed sec-
tion 16A(b)(l)-whether the trading tippee knew or recklessly
disregarded that the information was wrongfully obtained.
The Proposal included several other significant provisions.
Proposed sections 16A(a)(1)-(5) set forth in detail the impor-
tant policy considerations that justified the broad prohibitions.
In particular, the Proposal recognized the nefarious impact
that insider trading has on the fairness and efficiency of the
nation's securities markets." 5 In addition, the Proposal ac-
knowledged the "important public interest in the prompt flow
of information to the securities markets."" 6 In order to facil-
itate the creation and dissemination of information, the Pro-
posal allowed multi-service investment firms to rebut the pre-
sumption of insider trading liability." 7 The Proposal also in-
cluded a specific prohibition relating to insider trading and tip-
ping in the context of tender offers. Essentially, the Proposal
codified rule 14e-3."' Significantly, proposed section
16A(f)(1) authorized the SEC to "exempt any person, security
or transaction" if the SEC determined that such exemptive
action was not inconsistent with the Proposal." 9 Finally, the
Proposal provided an express private cause of action to con-
temporaneous traders but would have limited a violator's mon-
etary liability to the violator's "actual profit obtained or loss
avoided."'20
For the most part, the Proposal was a step in the right
direction, a step towards substantive congressional action. For
the first time, the Proposal clearly articulated the economic
and policy considerations controlling the field of insider trad-
ing. The Proposal would have included broad prohibitions
necessary to encompass harmful trading practices. At the same
time, however, the Proposal.was sufficiently specific to elimi-
nate some of the uncertainties that currently plague the law of
insider trading. If enacted, the Proposal would have synthe-
sized in a reasonably coherent manner the various legal theo-
114. 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
115. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(a)(l).
116. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(a)(4).
117. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(b)(2).
118. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(d). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1989)
and discussion of Rule 14e-3, supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
119. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(f)(I).
120. Proposal, supra note 104, at §§ 16A(g)(l)(A), 16A(g)(I)(B)(2).
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ries currently employed to punish inside traders. Another posi-
tive aspect of the Proposal was its proposed elimination of the
"personal benefits" analysis, an awkward and inherently vague
test concerning tipper-tippee liability. An additional beneficial
aspect of the Proposal was its express creation of a private
right of action. In view of the judicial trend against the implica-
tion of private causes of action,'21 the Proposal would have
eliminated any doubt that a private remedy was clearly intend-
ed.
The Proposal, however, had several significant draw-
backs.' First and foremost, the Proposal retained the am-
biguous and inappropriate fiduciary duty standard espoused by
the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States.2 ' Professor
Cox has correctly noted that "[t]he menace of Chiarella is its
embrace of the empty standard of a fiduciary relationship as
the litmus for regulation."'24 Indeed, the incongruous and
baffling results in Materia and Moss epitomize "the deficiencies
of the fiduciary principle."'25 The Proposal's retention of the
"empty" fiduciary standard would have perpetuated the ambi-
guities and anomalies of the current court-created law. 126
Quite simply, the Proposal's adherence to a fiduciary standard
ignores the "ethical precepts of fairness in the trading of secu-
rities" by permitting non-fiduciaries to trade on the basis of
grossly unfair informational advantages. 127
Another significant flaw of the Proposal was its codifica-
121. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (annotincing restrictive four-part
test); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no private right of
action under § 17(a) of the Exchange Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no private right of action under the antifraud
provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, but private cause of action for
rescission). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353 (1982) (private right of action available under certain provisions of Commodi-
ty Exchange Act).
122. Professor Macey has opined that the Proposal was simply "a model of vague-
ness and obfiscation." Macey, supra note 15, at 365.
123. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
124. Cox, supra note 88, at 397.
125. Note, Inside Infoirnation and Outside Tradeis: Coipoiate Recoveiy of the
Outsider's Unfair Gain, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 483, 506 (1985).
126. See generally Cox, supra note 88, at 386-97; Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, The
Coiporate Takeover Game and Recent Legislative Attempts to Define Insider Trading, 26
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229 (1988).
127. Phillips & Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need For Legislative Repair,
13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 97 (1984).
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tion of the misappropriation theory, an expansive theory of
liability premised on agency law.' Designed by the SEC in
response to the Supreme Court's narrow reading of rule
lOb-5,"2' the misappropriation theory has been roundly criti-
cized by commentators.'" In a vociferous attack, Professor
Cox has opined that the misappropriation theory:
[D]evalues all the jurisprudence that surrounds rule lOb-5.
So cheapened is its application that one should question
not only further developments under the antifraud rule,
but also those that have become acceptable. In the realm
of insider trading regulation, the misappropriation theory
poses a serious threat of swallowing the entire field.''
Because the Proposal would have incorrectly and unjustifiably
perpetuated the fundamentally flawed misappropriation theo-
ry, the Proposal was contrary to the policy goals of fairness
and equal access to information underlying insider trading
regulation.
Another lingering fraud-based remnant from the common
law of insider trading was the Proposal's limit on who could
initiate a private cause of action. Specifically, rather than allow-
ing all persons injured by reason of the wrongful insider trad-
ing, the Proposal restricted the private remedy to a narrow
group referred to as "contemporaneous traders." 3 2 Under
the Proposal, only those who traded while the violator was
trading in the market would have standing to sue.133 Under-
standably concerned with the threat of widespread vexatious
litigation, the drafters of the Proposal sought to limit the pri-
vate remedy to those who were indisputably and directly affect-
ed by the wrongful trading. The Proposal, however, went too
far. The Proposal ignored the harm to honest investors who,
128. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 88, at 389; Phillips & Zutz, supra note 127, at
99 (attacking the misappropriation theory and concluding that "codification of the
misappropriation theory would fall short of protecting investors from insider trad-
ing").
131. Cox, supra note 88, at 389.
132. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(g)(1)(A). The "contemporaneous trad-
ers" provision was retained in section 20A of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §
78t(A) (1988)], enacted as part of the 1988 Act.
133. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(g)(1)(A).
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while not trading contemporaneously with the violator, were
nevertheless injured by the violator's conduct. For example, a
bidder in a takeover contest who is not engaged in
open-market purchases of the target's stock at the time the
violator is trading in the market will likely be compelled to
offer a higher premium in the tender offer because the
violator's trading and disclosure drove up the price of the
target company's shares. Certainly the bidder is injured by the
violator's wrongful conduct. Under the Proposal, however, the
bidder is left without a private remedy because the bidder
could not squeeze itself under the title of "contemporaneous
trader.""3 4 Professor Langevoort has concluded that the con-
temporaneous trader concept lacks "any justification except
formalistic adherence to the notion of insider trading as fraud
(i.e., a privity equivalent)."3 5
Finally, the Proposal had too many special interest group
provisions. For instance, the Proposal provided the powerful
brokerage firms with a broad defense to insider trading claims
brought under the Proposal. Pursuant to proposed sections
16A(b)(2)(A) and 16A(b)(2)(B), brokerage firms could escape
liability by simply showing that the investment decision was not
tainted by material, nonpublic information and that the bro-
kerage firm had installed a "Chinese Wall."'3 6 Perhaps the
most influential of the special interest groups, the SEC, forced
proposed section 16A(f)(l) into the Proposal granting it broad
exemptive powers.
Despite several significant drawbacks, the Proposal is an
excellent starting point for future legislative action. It clearly
articulates the goals underlying the federal securities laws in
general and insider trading regulation in particular. It correctly
modifies and eliminates troublesome areas of the current law
134. See, e.g., Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Knhn Loeb, Inc., No. 86 Civ.
6447 (JMC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1989) (LEXIS, Cenfed library, Dist. file) (no showing
of damages because not trading contenporaneously with inside trader, Dennis
Levine).
135. Langevoort, supm note 15, at 410-11 (footnote omitted).
136. Proposal, supru note 104, at §§ 16A(b)(2)(A), 16A(b)(2)(B). A "Chinese
Wall" refers to systems and procedures implemented by inulti-service investment
firms to control the flow of material, nonpublic information within the firm. The
Proposal's expansive exemption for trading by a target company's management has
also been attacked as evidence of "the effectiveness of incumbent management as
a political coalition." See Macey, supra note 15, at 374.
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governing insider trading. The Proposal, however, is not per-
fect. It improperly retains inappropriate fraud-based theories
at the expense of fundamental notions of fairness. Future legis-
lation should, of course, incorporate the positive aspects of the
Proposal while attempting to eliminate the its negative implica-
tions.
IV. A NEW DYNAMIC DEFINITION OF AND PROHIBITION
AGAINST UNFAIR INSIDER TRADING
A. The Underlying Policy Considerations
At the outset, it is imperative to clearly articulate the goals
of any proposed legislation. The Act, entitled "The Unfair
Trading Act of 1991," is premised on fairness. In order to rees-
tablish investor confidence in the integrity of the national secu-
rities markets, the Act will specifically aim at protecting and
fostering investors' expectations of a fair marketplace. At the
same time, however, the Act seeks to insulate from its pro-
scriptions the legitimate and beneficial activities of market par-
ticipants such as securities analysts. More particularly, by their
skill, experience and diligence, securities analysts create and
interpret information relating to specific securities and inject
their analyses into the market." 7 The efforts of the securities
analysts result in a more informed and, hence, more efficient
market. Unlike the Proposal,3 8 however, the Act does not
provide securities analysts with a broad affirmative defense.
Instead, the securities analyst may, like all other investors,
counter charges of unfair insider trading with evidence that
the subject trades were not unfair. 3 9
B. The Act
The substantive provisions of the Act provide as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, to trade a security on the basis of material,
nonpublic information if such person knew or should have
137. But see Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76
VA. L. REV. 1023 (1990) (in which Professor Langevoort cautions against unques-
tioned acceptance that investment analysts merit special consideration under the
law of insider trading).
138. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(b)(2).
139. Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(b).
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known that such material, nonpublic information was ac-
quired unfairly.
(b) For the purposes of this section, material, nonpublic
information is acquired unfairly if such information was
used by, acquired from, or revealed by any person who has
access to confidential information relating to the security.
(c) Any person injured by a violation of this section may
initiate a private cause of action against any person who
violates this section and such injured person may recover
an amount of money damages consistent with such injury,
in addition to such equitable relief as a court of competent
jurisdiction shall deem necessary and appropriate.
The Act attempts to remove insider trading from the ru-
bric of fraud. The Act reflects the commonsensical realization
that unfair insider trading in an anonymous, impersonal mar-
ket does not fit within a reasonable interpretation of fraud.
The incoherent and confusing results reached under the cur-
rent law governing insider trading are due in large part to the
forced and often inappropriate application of common law
fraud principles. 4 ° Professor Langevoort has noted that "in-
sider trading may be many bad things, but it is unlikely that
[fraudulent] deception is one of them."' 4 ' Accordingly, the
Act is premised on fairness, not fraud. The Act focuses on the
inherently unfair abuses by persons with access to confidential
information. Thus, liability is based principally on the source
of the material, nonpublic information; not some amorphous
duty concept.
1. Subsection (a) of the Act
The opening language of subsection (a) of the Act, "[i]t
shall be unlawful," signifies that a violation of the Act entails
criminal, as well as civil, liability. That language would not alter
the enforcement scheme under existing law.' 42
140. See Langevoort, supra note 15, at 402; Note, supra note 125, at 494.
The current fraud-based law of insider trading does not promote the
policies of fairness and equal access to information underlying the
federal securities laws. The fiducia y principle narrows the scope of
liability to such an extent that many traders, unfairly using their privi-
leged access to information, are beyond the reach of Rule lOb-5.
Note, supra note 125, at 494.
141. Langevoort, supra note 15, at 402.
142. See § 32(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (1989). See also crimi-
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Because the gravest harm to investors occurs when a per-
son trades in a market on the basis of an informational advan-
tage gained in an unfair manner, subsection (a) imposes liabili-
ty when a person trades, not simply when a person selectively
discloses the confidential information. This is a significant
departure from the current law governing insider trading4 3
and from the Proposal.'44 Under the Proposal, the mere
"tipping" of material, nonpublic information is enough to trig-
ger liability, even in the absence of a subsequent trade by the
"tippee.""' While the selective disclosure of confidential in-
formation may violate agency, corporate or intellectual proper-
ty laws, such conduct does not, by itself, affect the securities
markets. As such, the mere "tipping" of information is beyond
the scope of the federal securities laws and, therefore, is not
prohibited by the Act. Instead, a violation of the Act turns on
the unfair trading of securities.'46
Liability under subsection (a) attaches only when a trade is
made "on the basis of' unfairly acquired material, nonpublic
information. To a large extent, the "on the basis of' language
does not modify the existing case law developed under rule
lOb-5.1 7 For instance, under both rule lOb-5 and the Act, the
claimant must allege and prove that the unfair trade was made
by a person "on the basis of' material, nonpublic information
and not merely while in possession of such information. 41
While it is logical that a reasonable inference may arise that a
trade was made on the basis of unfairly acquired material,
nonpublic information by a showing that the trader was in pos-
nal prosecution for violation of rule lOb-5, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), ceil. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983).
143. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228, 241 (2d Cir. 1974) (non-trading tipper liable under rule 10b-5, at least where
tippee trades).
144. See Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(c) and supra notes 112-14 and
accompanying text.
145. Pitt and Shapiro, supra note 15, at 422 n.23.
146. Non-trading tippers are, admittedly, despicable characters. Nevertheless,
because the integrity of the market is not undermined until an unfair trade is
executed, non-trading tippers are not liable under the Act.
147. See, e.g., Dirks v. United States, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
148. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 ("We hold that a duty
to disclose under 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
market information."); see also subsections (a) and (b) of the Act.
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session of such information, the trader may rebut such an
inference in a number of ways. For example, the trader may
show that the trade was based on nonmaterial or public infor-
mation. The trader may also put forth evidence that the mate-
rial, nonpublic information was not acquired unfairly. Similarly,
a multi-service investment firm in possession of unfairly ac-
quired material, nonpublic information may refute the infer-
ence that a trade was made "on the basis of" such information
by showing that the trading decision was driven by nonmaterial
information or publicly available information. In addition, the
investment firm may put forth evidence that the
decision-maker behind the subject trade was not in possession
of, nor did he or she have access to, material, nonpublic infor-
mation. By emphasizing the "on the basis of" language, subsec-
tion (a) attempts to protect trading decisions that are the re-
sult of an investor's skill and expertise. Subsection (a) is a di-
rect recognition of the substantial benefits that investors in
general and securities analysts in particular bring to the mar-
ketplace through their honest and diligent efforts. 4 ' At the
same time, attempting to avoid allegations that the Act is rid-
dled with politically influenced, special-interest-group exemp-
tions, 150 the Act applies a single set of rules for all market
participants.
The Act incorporates existing general concepts in an at-
tempt to avoid unnecessary litigation concerning the language
of the Act. Similar to the Proposal,' 5 ' subsection (a) employs
the well-developed phrase "material, nonpublic information."
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,'52 the Supreme Court
held that information is material if there is "a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the infor-
mation] important" or, "[p]ut another way, there [is] a substan-
tial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having signifi-
cantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."
149. Some have argued for a bright-line rule premised solely on whether the
trader was in possession of material, nonpublic information. See, e.g., Seligman, The
Refoination of Fedeal Secuiijes Law Concerning Nonpublic Infoination, 73 CEO. L.J.
1083 (1985).
150. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
151. Proposal, supra note 104, at §§ 16A(a)(I), 16A(b)(1), 16A(c) and 16(d)(l);
see also Pitt & Shapiro, supa note 15, at 416-17.
152. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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The materiality test of TSC Industries, announced in the con-
text of proxy disclosures, was subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court for rule 10b-5 actions in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson.5 The Act retains the fact-specific objective test of
materiality.
In addition to the requirement that the information is
material, the Act also requires that the information is
"nonpublic." Although not quite as developed as the term
"material," information is generally considered "public" if it
has been widely "disseminated in a manner calculated to reach
the securities marketplace in general through recognized chan-
nels of distribution."154 Similar to the materiality standard,
the Act retains the administrative and judicial construction of
"nonpublic."
Subsection (a) imposes liability on a trader if the trader
"knew or should have known" that the material, nonpublic
information was acquired unfairly. This objective standard
differs from the current scienter requirement of rule lOb-5. In
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,'55 the Supreme Court held that
rule 10b-5 required proof of scienter 156 or, in the words of
the Court, proof of a "mental state embracing intent to de-
ceive, manipulate, or defraud."'57 Under rule 10b-5, it is un-
certain whether scienter encompasses not only knowledge, but
also recklessness. 58 By contrast, under the Act, liability is im-
posed when the trader knew or recklessly disregarded the fact
that the confidential information was acquired unfairly. The
Act goes further than existing rule 10b-5 law, however, and im-
poses liability if a reasonable person under the circumstances
would have known that such information was acquired unfair-
ly. The expansive standard of liability, is admittedly harsh, but
153. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
154. In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 255 (1973); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971).
155. 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
156. Id. at 193; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
157. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
158. 446 U.S. at 690-91. The overwhelhing majority of lower courts have held
that recklessness is sufficient to state a claim under rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Van Dyke
v. Coburn Enterprises, 873 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766
F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985), cea. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985); Vucinich v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
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the seriousness and destructiveness of unfair insider trading
supports such a broad standard. In the context of tipper-tippee
liability, however, the Act's objective standard is consistent
with current case law.' 59 In Investors Management Co., Inc., 6 '
the Commission stated that "[c]onsiderations of both fairness
and effective enforcement demand that the standard as to the
requisite knowledge be satisfied by proof that the recipient
had reason to know of the non-public character of the infor-
mation, and that it not be necessary to establish actual knowl-
edge of that fact." Similarly, the objective standard is also con-
sonant with the standard of liability under rule 14e-3. 6 '
2. Subsection (b) of the Act
Subsection (b) of the Act details how material, nonpublic
information is "acquired unfairly." Because the Act is both an
acquisition and use statute, subsection (b), in conjunction with
subsection (a), prohibits the unfair acquisition and use of mate-
rial, nonpublic information in connection with a trade of secu-
rities. Under subsection (b), information is acquired unfairly "if
such information was used by, acquired from, or revealed by"
a person in a position with access to confidential information.
If a person with access to confidential information concerning
a security trades (i.e., uses the information to trade) the securi-
ty on the basis of such information, such person is liable under
the Act. Likewise, if a person steals or otherwise acquires mate-
rial, nonpublic information from a person with access to confi-
dential information relating to a security and subsequently
trades the security on the basis of such information, liability is
imposed. In addition, under the expansive, but non-exhaustive,
159. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (where Court held that "a tip-
pee assumes a fiduciary duty to shareholders of a corporation . . . only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders . . . and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach") (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). But see United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1990), rehg
granted, [1990 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,439 at 97,238 (Aug.
24, 1990) (where court held that a tippee tinder rule lOb-5 must have knowledge
that the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by selectively disclosing the material,
nonpublic information).
160. 44 S.E.C. 633, 644 (1971).
161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e.3 (1989). Rule 14e-3 imposes liability on designated
individuals and entities who know or have reason to know that the information is
material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer.
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description of "acquired unfairly," a trader is liable if a person
with access to confidential information reveals (i.e., "tips")
material, nonpublic information to a trader who subsequently
trades on the basis of the material, nonpublic information.
The thrust of subsection (b) analysis is determining who
has "access to confidential information relating to the secu-
rity." While the concept of "access" is unique,'62 its roots are
deep and well established. The Commission in In re Cady, Rob-
erts & Co. explained that the duty to disclose or abstain rested,
in part, on "the existence of a relationship giving access, direct-
ly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone." 6 ' Similarly, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the
court emphasized that "[t]he only regulatory objective is that
access to material information be enjoyed equally."' 64 Justice
Blackmun, in his eloquent dissent in Chiarella v. United States,
opined that "persons having access to confidential material
information that is not available to others generally are pro-
hibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to exploit
their structural informational advantage through trading in af-
fected securities."
165
The Act intentionally leaves the precise meaning of "ac-
cess" unspecified. Although that imprecision will likely spawn
some litigation, a broad and flexible definition of the term is
necessary in order to encompass new and sophisticated unfair
trading schemes. At a minimum, however, persons with "ac-
cess" should include officers, directors, certain employees and
agents, influential controlling shareholders, and attorneys,
accountants and investment bankers associated with the issu-
er. 1
66
162. The United Kingdom's prohibition against insider trading is also premised
on the concept of access to confidential information. The United Kingdom's
statute, however, uses the terms "connection" with and "connected" to an issuer
of securities. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, Company Securities (Insider
Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8, 1(1), (2), (3), (4), 9; see generally Note, A New Look at
the Eurpean Economic Community Directive on Insider Trading, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 135 (1990).
163. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (emphasis added).
164. 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (em-
phasis added).
165. 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
166. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (describing "tempo-
rary insiders" as including an "underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant").
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The phrase "confidential information" used in subsection
(b) is different from, and broader than, the phrase "material,
nonpublic information."'67 Information is confidential if its
disclosure, regardless of its materiality, would violate either
agency, corporate or intellectual property laws. On the other
hand, information is generally considered material only if it
would substantially influence a reasonable investor."6 Infor-
mation is nonpublic if it has not been widely disseminated. 69
Thus, a person has "access to confidential information" even if
such person does not have access to material, nonpublic infor-
mation. The purpose of this textual difference is to enlarge the
group of persons from whom liability under subsection (a) may
attach. In practice, this textual difference will encompass peo-
ple with access to information that is confidential but is not, by
itself, material. It should be noted, however, that the informa-
tion used by, acquired from, or revealed by the person with
access must be material and nonpublic and not simply confi-
dential in order for liability to arise under the Act.
Finally, the phrase "relating to the security" in subsection
(b) signifies the intent to include both firm-specific informa-
tion (i.e., dividends and earnings) and general market infor-
mation (i.e., tender offers and mergers) within the
conscriptures of the Act. Such an interpretation is consistent
with current case law.'
70
3. Subsection (c) of the Act
Subsection (c) of the Act creates an express private cause
of action for persons "injured by a violation of' subsection (a).
Establishing an express private remedy "augments SEC en-
forcement of the federal securities laws," and sharpens "the
deterrent element so essential in securities transactions.'
7 1
Subsection (c) is broader than some proposals limiting recov-
167. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
170. Current case law under rule l0b-5 does not make a distinction between
"inside" information-information created within the corporation-and "outside" in-
formation-information originating outside the corporation. See Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 656 n.15 (1983).
171. Note, Pivate Causes of Action for Option Investos Under SEC Rule l01b5: A
Policy, Doctina and Economic Analysis, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1963 (1987) (foot-
note omitted).
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ery to the corporate issuer" and other legislative recom-
mendations, namely the Proposal, limiting recovery to "con-
temporaneous traders."173 The Act attempts to place a signif-
icant enforcement role on those investors who are injured be-
cause of the unfair trading. Limiting recovery to the corporate
issuer may be an effective method of curbing spurious lawsuits,
but such a limitation leaves those who were directly harmed by
the egregious conduct without an effective remedy. Rather
than enhancing investor confidence, such a restrictive recovery
provision would likely buttress the injured investor's belief that
the legal system, cannot repair the inequities of the securities
markets. Similarly, limiting recovery to "contemporaneous
traders" is too restrictive and would ignore those investors
injured by, although not trading contemporaneously with, an
inside trader.'
74
The express private remedy provided for in subsection (c)
of the Act abrogates the "purchaser-seller" rule applicable to
insider trading actions commenced under rule lOb-5. In gener-
al, the "purchaser-seller" rule, announced by the Second Cir-
cuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 175 and adopted by the
Supreme Court nearly twenty years later in Blue Chips Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,176 limits standing in rule lOb-5 actions to
actual purchasers or sellers of the affected securities. Ac-
cording to the Court, the narrow "purchaser-seller" standing
rule is warranted because of the "in connection with" language
of rule lOb-5.177
The Act does not include the limiting "in connection
with" language of rule lOb-5. Instead, subsection (c) provides
an express private cause of action for "[a]ny person injured by"
a violation of subsection (a). The broad language in subsection
(c) is specifically intended to provide private remedies for in-
vestors who are injured by unfair trading but who did not
purchase or sell the subject security.
Subsection (c) is not, however, without limits. In order to
fit within subsection (c), a private plaintiff must allege and
172. See Note, supra note 125, at 507-23.
173. See Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(g)(1)(A).
174. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
175. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cea. denied. 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
176. 421 U.S. 723 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1976).
177. Id. at 728.
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prove that he or she was injured by a defendant's violation of
subsection (a). Accordingly, subsection (c) would require a
showing of causation.'78
The amount of money damages recoverable pursuant to
subsection (c) is subject to the broad, but reasonable, discre-
tion of the trier-of-fact. The amount of damages is not without
limitations. Specifically, the amount of damages must be com-
pensatory. That is, the award must be consistent with the
investor's injury. Therefore, the award should reflect the losses
proximately sustained by the injured investor because of the
unfair trading of the violator. This aspect of subsection (c)
differs markedly from the Proposal. Rather than focusing on
the profits obtained or the losses avoided by the wrongdoer,
the Act aims at re-dressing the harm sustained by the injured
investor. 79 Because the losses sustained by numerous inves-
tors as a result of the wrongdoer's conduct will likely exceed
the benefits obtained by the wrongdoer, under the Proposal
the injured investors' recovery is merely a fraction of their
actual losses. Subsection (c) attempts to avoid the empty,
pyrrhic victory provided for in the Proposal and seeks instead
to fully compensate an investor injured by a violation of the
Act. 180
Subsection (c) of the Act also provides that a court may,
where necessary and appropriate, award equitable relief. For
instance, a court may grant injunctive relief, order
disgorgement or appoint a receiver, among other equitable
measures, where circumstances warrant such action. It is the
178. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cell. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977). It should be noted, however, that simply because subsection
(a) employs similar language as the antitrust laws, case law developed under the
antitrust laws should not be grafted on to the Act. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986) (requiring antitrust injury).
Instead, courts interpreting the Act should be guided by the Supreme Court's
rejection of the proposition that a "RICO injury" is necessary in order to state a
cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Inirex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
179. See Proposal, supra note 104, at § 16A(g)(l)(B)(2) ("No person shall be lia-
ble in any private action ... for an amount in excess of such person's actual
profit obtained or loss avoided"). See also Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, § 20A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(l) (1988).
180. The Act would not supplant the availability of treble damages as provided
for in the 1984 Act. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, § 21A(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(2) (1988).
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intent of the Act to allow a court significant leeway in fashion-
ing equitable remedies that it deems both necessary in the
furtherance of the Act's goals and appropriate under the cir-
cumstances.
81
C. Testing the Act
1. The Insider
Suppose A, a director of XYZ, Inc., learns at a Board of
Directors meeting that XYZ's quarterly earnings have increased
fourfold. Suppose further that such information is material
and, as of yet, nonpublic. Shortly after the meeting, A, capital-
izing on his position as a director of XYZ, purchases 10,000
shares of XYZ common stock8 2 currently trading on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) at $20 per share. Of course,
A did not, and likely could not, disclose to the trading market
the confidential earnings information before executing the
above-described trade. Several days later, XYZ announces its
tremendous quarterly earnings and, in response, the price of
XYZ's common stock quicklyjumps from $20 per share to $25
per share.' Certainly, any definition of unfair insider trad-
ing must prohibit such pernicious conduct.
Under the Act, A would be liable because he knew or
should have known that the earnings information was acquired
unfairly. Specifically, because A has access to confidential infor-
mation, and because A "used" such information, A's trading
clearly falls within the proscriptions of the Act. As such, under
subsection (c), A is subject to liability to any person who
proves a proximate injury because of A's unfair trading. 4 A
181. Finally, because the Act details only the substantive provisions of a defi-
nition of and prohibition against insider trading, the Act does not address periph-
eral, but nonetheless important, issues such as jurisdiction, venue and congres-
sional findings. Such issues, of course, must be included in a comprehensive legis-
lative definition of and prohibition against unfair insider trading.
182. Under the Act, the term "security" should be interpreted broadly to
include derivative securities such as options and futures. For an examination of
liability under rule lOb-5 for insider trading in connection with such derivative in-
struments, see Wang, A Cause of Action for Option Tradeis Against Insider Option
Tradeis, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1988); Note, supra note 171.
183. For the purpose of this hypothetical, assume that the volume of A's
trading does not, by itself, affect the market price of XYZ common stock.
184. A would also be subject to criminal prosecution pursuant to subsection
(a) of the Act.
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could, however, escape liability if he could somehow show that
his trade was not made "on the basis of" the material and
nonpublic earnings information.
2. The Temporary Insider.85
Assume the same facts as above but that B, an outside
accountant hired by XYZ to assist in the preparation of the
quarterly financial reports, purchases in an open market trans-
actions on the NYSE several hundred shares of XYZ common
stock, also at a price of $20 per share. Again, hoping to exploit
his temporary informational advantage, B does not disclose to
the trading market the information concerning XYZ's phenom-
enal earnings for the most recent quarter. Similar to A, be-
cause of B's access to confidential information, B would be
liable to any person injured by B's unfair trading if B traded
on the basis of the material and nonpublic earnings informa-
tion and if B knew or should have known that the information
was acquired unfairly (that is, acquired from B's access to con-
fidential information).
3. Tippees
Returning to the hypothetical situation involving A, sup-
pose that A, in addition to unfairly trading in XYZ common
stock, telephones his wife, C. A informs C that he just learned
that XYZ's quarterly earnings have gone through the roof and
that she should buy at least 1,000 shares of XYZ common
stock as soon as possible. Within minutes of her telephone
conversation with A, C dutifully calls her stockbroker. Mo-
ments later, C's order purchasing 1,000 shares of XYZ com-
mon stock is confirmed. C's conduct is patently unfair and,
under the Act, prohibited. More particularly, C would be liable
to any person injured by her unfair trading so long as it is
shown that C purchased the XYZ stock on the basis of materi-
al, nonpublic information (the unannounced quarterly earn-
ings) and that she knew or should have known that such infor-
mation was acquired from a person with access to confidential
information relating to XYZ. Significantly, it would not be
185. The concept of "temporary insiders" derives from footnote 14 of the
Dirks opinion. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
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necessary to prove that A, by his disclosure, received some
nebulous personal benefit. 6 However, because the Act is
primarily concerned with the unfair trading of securities, A's
self-interested and selective disclosure, by itself, is outside of
the scope of the Act.
Now suppose that C told her friend, D, that XYZ's quar-
terly earnings have increased substantially and that it would be
a good idea to buy XYZ common stock before the impending
announcement. Assume further that D, without disclosing the
earnings information prior to trading, purchases XYZ common
stock on the NYSE, also at $20 per share. Additionally, assume
that D's purchase was based on the material and nonpublic
earnings information. In order to impose liability on D under
the Act, a prosecutor or injured investor must establish that
the information was acquired from, or revealed by, a person
with access to confidential information concerning XYZ. Re-
gardless of whether C is determined to have access to confi-
dential information concerning XYZ because of her marital re-
lationship with A, D could be held liable under the Act if it is
shown that D knew or should have known that the earnings
information was initially revealed by a source with access to
confidential information. Unlike the first three hypotheticals,
D's liability is not so clear. Indeed, as the information is passed
down the line, liability will ultimately turn on what the remote
tippee knew or should have known concerning the source of
the information. Admittedly, this is an imprecise aspect of the
Act. Nevertheless, because the Act eliminates the vague per-
sonal benefits analysis, the Act is a significant improvement
over the current chaotic law governing insider trading.
Perhaps another hypothetical will illuminate the inequities
that can arise under the personal benefits test. Suppose that
after learning of the earnings information, A telephones T, an
aggressive analyst who follows XYZ. In addition, assume that A
and T are not personally acquainted. Assume also that A's
disclosure to T is not done in order to line A's pockets. Final-
ly, assume that, on the basis of the material and nonpublic
earnings information, T personally purchases on the NYSE a
large block of XYZ common stock, also at $20 per share. Un-
der current case law, A's disclosure to T would not satisfy the
186. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying ,cxl.
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personal benefits test because A has not benefited from the
disclosure.187 By contrast, under the Act, T would be liable if
it is established that T knew or should have known that the
material, nonpublic information was acquired from or revealed
by a person (A) with access to confidential information.
4. Analysts
As noted above, securities analysts are not afforded any
special exemptions or defenses under the Act. 88 Instead, like
all other investors, an analyst's liability under the Act will de-
pend, in part, on whether the trade was made on the basis of
material, nonpublic information acquired from, or revealed by,
a person with access to confidential information relating to the
subject security. For example, suppose that AN learns from A
that XYZ's quarterly earnings have quadrupled. If AN then
trades on the basis of such material, nonpublic information,
AN, like C, would be liable under the Act to any person in-
jured by AN's unfair trading. Similarly, if AN learns of the
material and nonpublic information while assisting XYZ in
some respect, AN, like B, would be liable because AN is a
person with access to confidential information concerning
XYZ. On the other hand, if AN examines material but public
information concerning XYZ or acquires immaterial but
nonpublic information relating to XYZ and, through AN's skill,
experience and diligence, concludes that XYZ's quarterly earn-
ings will increase substantially, AN has not traded on the basis
of material, nonpublic information. In such a case, AN would
not be liable under the Act.
5. Creators of Information
Similar to the securities analyst are other individuals or
entities that, by their skill, experience and diligence, create
material, nonpublic information relating to a security. For
example, assume that BID, Inc. is planning on commencing a
187. It may be possible, however, to construct an argument that T was a
"temporary insider" under the analysis of Dirks and, hence, should be prohibited
from trading on the basis of the earnings information. A prosecutor or plaintiff
would need to establish that T was given the information for a legitimate cor-
porate purpose and that T knew that such information was confidential. See Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
188. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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tender offer for TAR, Inc. Assume further that information
concerning this imminent tender offer is both material and
nonpublic (not a very difficult assumption). Now suppose that
BID purchases shares of TAR on the NYSE prior to announc-
ing the tender offer. Has BID violated the Act? The short an-
swer is no. BID has created the information concerning TAR
and has not acquired the information from, nor was it revealed
by, a person with access to confidential information concern-
ing TAR. Accordingly, purchases of TAR shares made by or on
behalf of BID would not violate subsection (a) of the Act. If,
however, a person with access to confidential information con-
cerning BID learns about the impending tender offer and then
trades on the basis of such material, nonpublic information,
the renegade trader would be liable under the Act. Such an
interpretation of the Act would permit those who, through
their own efforts and skill, create material, nonpublic informa-
tion to benefit from their industriousness.'
Similarly, suppose that a financial periodical, the WSJ, is
so influential that its comments can significantly affect the
price of a security. In addition, suppose that the contents of its
upcoming articles are material, nonpublic information. Under
the Act, the WSJ, as an entity, may benefit from an informa-
tional advantage that it has fairly created. 9 ° On the other
hand, if a person with access to this material, nonpublic infor-
mation trades on the basis of it, such a person would be liable
under the Act. While it may appear that permitting the cre-
ators of information to exploit informational advantages is
unfair, a contrary result would unjustifiably deny individuals
and entities who, through their skill, experience and efforts,
assemble and create information, from benefiting from their
labors. It is important to emphasize that the Act does not at-
tempt to require equal possession of information. Rather, the
Act prohibits those with access to confidential information
from unfairly exploiting their positions.
189. This result is consonant with the likely result under Rule 14e-3 [17 C.F.R.
§ 240-14e-3 (1989)].
190. This factual setting is lifted friom the Winans/Wall Street Journal case. See
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1087).
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V. CONCLUSION
The current administrative and judicial interpretations of
the various statutory provisions governing insider trading are
inconsistent and incoherent. The discordant administrative and
judicial decisions have contributed to the erosion of investors'
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the securities mar-
kets. The courts have introduced inappropriate fraud-based
principles while, at the same time, ignoring fundamental tenets
of fairness. The confusing judicial opinions reached under the
misappropriations theory and the troublesome personal bene-
fit test underscore the necessity of a concise definition of and
prohibition against insider trading.
The Proposal put forth in 1987 was a significant step to-
ward reestablishing notions of fairness and accountability in
the securities markets. The Proposal, however, fell victim to
politics.
This article has introduced the Act, a variation of the Pro-
posal. The Act is premised on fairness and would, in general,
prohibit the unfair trading of securities. Unfair trading, in
turn, depends on the source of the information which prompt-
ed the trade. The Act prohibits those with access to confiden-
tial information from trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information. Moreover, the Act prohibits those who
acquire material, nonpublic information from a person with
access to confidential information from trading on the basis of
such information. In order to provide individual private inves-
tors with a sense of self-determination, the Act provides for
broad legal and equitable relief.
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